A. INTRODUCTION
Under many legal systems, several causes of action may arise from one and the same set of facts. This article focuses on situations where, between two parties, 1 a single incident (allegedly) gives rise to a contractual and a tortious cause of action.
2 Under many laws such claims are cumulative in nature and the claimant may pursue one or the other, or both, in order to recoup his losses. Examples may be the liability of a doctor in relation to a patient for negligent medical treatment, product liability of a manufacturer against his buyer, or liability under a contract of carriage for personal injury or cargo damage.
In such cases, diffi cult questions of private international law arise. This article is confi ned to jurisdictional and jurisdiction-related issues under the Judgments Regulation; 3 choice-of-law problems 4 as well as national jurisdictional law will not be considered. However, as far as the Regulation leaves questions to national law, English law will be considered primarily. The focus will lie on elaborating the applicable legal principles de lege lata (under the current version of the Regulation), rather than on developing new proposals de lege ferenda.
In this context, several questions arise. Firstly, concerning jurisdiction, it ought to be examined if and to what extent the claimant may, apart from Article 2, bring his claims under Article 5(1) and/or 5(3) 5 and particularly whether and to what extent he has a free choice as to how to frame his claim for these purposes. This involves analysing whether these provisions are mutually exclu-sive. Even if they are, however, it would not automatically follow that they cannot simultaneously apply; this clearly emerges from the Kalfelis case. 6 Secondly, if the claimant may, indeed, pursue his claims in different fora, questions of parallel litigation (Articles 27, 28) must be examined -in particular, whether in such cases the contractual proceedings involve the same cause of action as the tortious proceedings. On the other hand, delicate questions of res judicata will arise, 7 namely whether judgment on one claim precludes the other and, if not, how double satisfaction can be prevented.
B. CONCURRENT LIABILITY: JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 5(1) AND 5(3)
If the claimant alleges to have, according to the (allegedly) applicable law, cumulatively a claim in contract and in tort, both providing for compensation of the same damage out of the same incident, the question arises whether he can pursue these claims under Article 5(1) and/or 5(3) and whether this is subject to his free choice. At the jurisdictional stage, the applicable law is yet to be determined and it is unknown whether the substantive law (or even the choice-of-law rules) will allow cumulative pursuance and obtaining multiple judgments (cumulative remedies), require election of either cause of action (alternative remedies) , 8 or will provide for the French principle of non-cumul (one remedy being subsidiary). 9 However, relying on the hypothetically applicable law is unfavourable and inconsistent with the independent interpretation of matters relating to contract/tort by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 10 This section does not intend to give a comprehensive overview of Article 5(1) and 5(3). In the context of concurrent liability, the following issues are of particular interest. Firstly, the relationship between those provisions -in particular, whether they are mutually exclusive 11 and require a "channelling" of all claims to one head or whether they allow a "splitting" of the dispute into 6 Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst, Case 189/87 [1988] ECR 5565. 7 As long as the fi rst proceedings are pending, res judicata issues may arise only if Arts 27 and 28 do not apply; however, after termination they arise in any case. The question whether these provisions are "all-embracing" (as one might infer from the Kalfelis defi nition for matters in tort) is beyond the scope of this article as it is not of particular importance for present purposes. It suffi ces to say that the ECJ accepted in Reichert v Dresdner Bank (No 2), Case C-261/90 [1992] ECR I-2149 that there are cases falling within neither Article 5(1) nor 5(3), there being some additional requirements derived from the words "liability" or "harmful event"; see also Kleinwort Benson v Glasgow City Council (No 2) [1999] 1 AC 153 (HL) [172] (Lord Goff), [196] (Lord Hutton). different fora. Secondly, whether the claimant can "choose" the jurisdictional head by skilful drafting of his claim; this involves analysis of whose allegations (the claimant's and/or the defendant's) are relevant as well as of the required standard of proof to bring a claim under either head. Thirdly, whether there is "accessory jurisdiction" for related claims in the respective forum.
"entire dispute" which comprises so to speak "all causes of action contained in the proceedings/dispute". The second can be described as the "respective single cause of action/claim" which is a "part of the action as a whole/entire dispute".
This terminological confusion might have been one of the reasons which led to an apparent consensus that Article 5(1) and 5(3) are "mutually exclusive"; however, that confusion in fact conceals two fundamentally different positions: 17 one view assumes "mutual exclusivity" in relation to the "entire dispute"; this leads to an exclusion of tort claims from Article 5(3) as soon as there is a contract (however closely related) in the parties' relationship. The "opposing" view conceives "mutual exclusivity" only with regard to each "single cause of action"; this allows tort claims to be pursued under Article 5(3) notwithstanding the fact that collateral contractual claims fall under Article 5(1). It will be argued that this second approach is, apart from the fact that it accords with the ECJ's view in Kalfelis, 18 the better view -at least de lege lata.
(b) The Kalfelis Decision: No Accessory Jurisdiction and No Exclusive Effects of a Contract under Article 5(3)
In that case, the claimant based his claim (seeking remedy for a certain sum of money as a result of negligent advice by a bank in fi nancial transactions) on contract, tort and unjust enrichment. Firstly, the ECJ established an autonomous interpretation of the concept "matters relating to tort" as covering "all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a 'contract' within the meaning of Article 5(1)". 20 This part of the decision is usually referred to as establishing the "mutual exclusivity" between Article 5(1) and 5(3). However, the ECJ held, secondly, that "a court which has jurisdiction under Article 5(3) over an action in so far as it is based on tort or delict does not have jurisdiction over that action in so far as it is not so based"; 21 in other words, the claimant may pursue his "action" under Article 5(3) only (but at least!) in so far as it is based on tort. On the one hand, this part of the decision denies accessory jurisdiction under Article 5(3). 22 On the other hand, however, the judgment clearly establishes that the mere existence of a related contract in the set of facts (as there was!) cannot suffi ce to exclude the claim from Article 5(3). Accordingly, the ECJ acknowledged the possibility of a fragmentation of a "single dispute" into different fora 23 and, without saying so explicitly, qualifi ed each cause of action separately. Consequently, only each such "single cause of action" is the object of the "mutual exclusivity" dictum.
(c) Confl icting Views in Literature and Case Law (i) Prevailing View in Germany: Separate Analysis of Each "Single Cause of Action" and No Exclusive Effects of a Contract
The prevailing view 24 in many European civil law countries (particularly in Germany) appears to be that the existence of a contract in the parties' relationship does not as such exclude tort claims from Article 5(3) and does not make them "matters relating to a contract" at the characterisation stage. Article 5(3) is not considered subsidiary to Article 5(1) and the availability of the latter does not exclude tort claims from the former; this is sometimes based on a correct understanding of Kalfelis.
25 A separate pursuance of cumulative causes of action under both Article 5(1) and 5(3) is recognised. Although it is accepted that Article 5(1) and 5(3) are "mutually exclusive", they are regarded so only in relation to each "single cause of action"; only in so far the claimant has no choice whether to frame his claim in contract or tort. Contractual and tortious claims are regarded as separate causes of action, capable of being qualifi ed independently for jurisdictional purposes. Interestingly, this is not usually considered as problematic but impliedly assumed as a given.
( he based it on a tortious breach of duty for the same reason. The Court of Appeal held that " [b] oth the causes of action" are excluded from Article 5(3) "because they are both related to a contract" and that "a claim which may be brought under a contract or independently of a contract on the same facts, save that the contract does not need to be established, is [excluded from Article 5(3)]". 27 At fi rst sight, one might infer from this judgment that whenever there is a contract between the relevant parties (related to the relevant facts), that contract necessarily excludes related tort claims from Article 5(3). 28 However, that conclusion does not necessarily follow from that case. It must be noted that the Court of Appeal, though using the singular and the plural interchangeably, effectively qualifi ed both causes of action separately and held that both are (by themselves) related to a contract. The reason for qualifying the tort claim under Article 5(1) was not the mere fact that there was a contract between the parties but rather the fact that the tortious liability in question (namely the duty of care to draw up proper reports) necessarily presupposed such a contract without which this tort could never have existed.
29 This is reinforced by the words "save that the contract does not need to be established" which seem to indicate that a claim for tortious liability nonetheless falls under Article 5(3) if that liability does not depend on a contract. Consequently, the mere existence of a contract as such does not exclude tort claims from Article 5(3). Examples may be claims for product liability by a buyer against his seller/manufacturer 30 or claims by a patient against his doctor for negligent medical treatment. 31 Both of these liabilities, if framed in tort, do not, under many laws, require the proof of a contract. The tortious duty (not to cause damage by a product and not to injure someone physically) exists irrespective of any contract. This is in line with the reasoning (obiter) of Morison J in Rayner v Davies 32 who was also concerned with a claim for breach of contract and a claim for breach of a tortious duty of care to carry out a survey and draw up reports carefully. He qualifi ed both causes of action separately and held that "it is sensible to regard both claims as relating to a contract" since " [t] the parties which gives rise to the duty in tort is founded upon the contract". As in the Source case, the tort claim "arose precisely because there was a contractual relationship which gave rise to the duty of care".
RZB v NBG 33 concerned a claim for breach of contract (an undertaking to pay on completion of certain events and a warranty of non-default under a related loan agreement at that time) and/or negligent misrepresentation. Concerning the latter, Tuckey J essentially left open whether it falls under Article 5(1) (on the basis that Source 34 is still good law) or 5(3) (on the basis that it has been overruled by Kleinwort Benson 35 ). The question whether a claim for misrepresentation as such falls within Article 5(1) or 5(3) is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is apparent that Tuckey J "split" the action and -just as Staughton LJ did in Source 36 -qualifi ed the two claims separately. 37 Although this case can, admittedly, also be resolved by a different route of reasoning, namely that these were "separate claims" concerning different facts, 38 Tuckey J nonetheless implied -by indicating his opinion that the tort claim falls rather under Article 5(3) -that the existence of a contract as such does not exclude related tort claims from that provision.
The alternative way of reasoning was taken in Domicrest v Swiss Bank 39 which concerned a contractual claim under an alleged payment order/guarantee and (eventualiter) a tortious claim for misrepresentation that such a payment order is as good as cash. Rix J held, distinguishing the Source case, that these claims are "not parallel" and based on opposite lines of arguments and therefore the latter claim plainly falls within Article 5(3). It suffi ces to say here that even if such claims can be said to concern different facts and, accordingly, no (proper) accumulation of causes of action, the result would be the same a fortiori.
Although there are indications to the contrary, 40 it can be concluded that the English case law generally favours a separate qualifi cation of contractual and tortious claims, subsuming the latter under Article 5(1) only if and because it is founded upon and necessarily presupposes a contract, but not otherwise, even if a related contract exists between the parties. This approach appears to be consistent with the Kalfelis decision. Supra n 6 and Section B.1(b).
(iii) Different View: Uniform Qualifi cation and A Priori Exclusive Effects of a Contract on Tort Claims under Article 5(3)
On the other hand, many authors as well as the Irish High Court 42 counsel a view of uniform qualifi cation of the entire dispute as well as exclusive effects of a contract on tort claims under Article 5(3). Although it is surprisingly obvious that the ECJ in fact ruled precisely the opposite, 43 Kalfelis 44 is often cited as an authority supporting such a position.
Burke v Uvex 45 involved a claim by a buyer against his seller (not being the manufacturer) for damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by a defective product. He based his claim solely on tort of negligence and breach of duty at common law. The Irish High Court held, (wrongfully) relying on the autonomous defi nition in Kalfelis, 46 that, although the claim was based solely on tort, the "court cannot overlook the existence of the contractual relationship, however basic, between the plaintiff and the … defendant" and that the "plaintiff cannot avoid the consequences of the existence of that contract by seeking his remedy solely in tort". Therefore, the claimant was prevented from bringing his claim under Article 5(3). 47 At least the reasoning seems unsound and framed in too general terms; the court regarded the mere fact of a contract's existence between the parties as decisive for the qualifi cation of the tort claim. It did not analyse this claim separately and ask whether the alleged liability is the result of an obligation freely assumed 48 (the alleged tort necessarily presupposing a contract) or if the tortious duty exists independently of any contract. In the light of the reasoning, the court's answer would probably have been the same had the seller also been the manufacturer and had the claim been based solely on product liability (which does not presuppose but might still exist alongside a contract). It is argued here that it would be wrong to desperately "press" an action, which is based on breach of contract and on product liability, into a single category, both claims necessarily being the same, namely contractual, merely because the manufacturer happens to be the seller.
However 55 Apparently, this conclusion mainly results from the fact that the "action (or the underlying dispute) as a whole" is qualifi ed uniformly, presupposing that all alleged claims necessarily need to fall under one and the same head. A "split of the action" is, for some unexpressed reason, categorically rejected; this results in some sort of "supremacy of the contractual forum". In contrast, the English case law suggests a separate qualifi cation and relevance of the question whether each separate cause of action necessarily presupposes a contract or whether such liability exists independently of any contract. Regarding these opposing positions, differences in outcome particularly result in cases of claims based on product liability against the seller/manufacturer or claims based on personal injury for negligent medical treatment against a doctor.
( iv) Two Possible Approaches Following a View of "A Priori Exclusive Effects of a Contract"
If it were correct that the mere existence of a contract as such excludes tort claims from Article 5(3), the question arises whether such tort claims can be brought under Article 5(1). Two answers are conceivable:
(a) On the one hand, it could be followed that any tort claim which arises between contractual parties must actually be qualifi ed as a "matter relating to contract"; after all, the argument to exclude the tort claim from Article 5(3) was because it was said to relate to a contract (not satisfying the Kalfelis defi nition). Nonetheless, this is usually made subject to the additional requirement that the claim must be based upon a "particular contractual obligation" as laid down in 51 Supra n 4, 58-59, 374; similarly Briggs and Rees, supra n 12, 220 [1].
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Supra n 12, 251-52. 53 Supra n 11. 54 See supra, Section B.1(c)(ii).
55
At least as far as the claims are not considered "separate claims" (being based on different facts); cf Fawcett et al, supra n 4, 57-61, 374; Cheshire, supra n 12, 252. the controversial decision of Kleinwort Benson. 56 However, it is diffi cult to see how a tort claim may ever be based on such a contractual obligation being regarded as the "obligation in question". The result would be that the tort claim is excluded from Article 5(1) because it is not based on a contract and from Article 5(3) because it relates to a contract. 57 This reasoning is unsound in principle and contains inherent contradictions.
If it were correct that the tort claim "disappears from Article 5", a further argument may be invoked: if the claimant pursues the contract claim under Article 5(1), this would effectively amount to a substantive waiver of the tort claim, 58 unless it would still be possible for him to bring the latter under Article 2. Such a waiver was certainly not intended by the framers by providing for special jurisdiction. 59 It follows that it would still be possible to pursue the tort claim under Article 2 (to the exclusion of the already pending contract claim; Article 27). Evidently, such a solution would nonetheless involve a splitting of the action which was categorically rejected by Fawcett et al. 60 For that reason, nothing would be gained in terms of "procedural economy" compared with splitting the causes of action in Article 5(1) and 5(3).
(b) On the other hand, it could be argued that, notwithstanding Kleinwort Benson, 61 the exclusion of a tort claim from Article 5(3) as a result of a contract's existence automatically means that the tort claim is contractual (for jurisdictional purposes) and thus "channelled to Article 5(1) by way of characterization". 62 This type of channelling is to be distinguished from and logically excludes any accessory jurisdiction. 63 It would have, in terms of procedural economy, the advantage that one and the same dispute would be tried in one single forum only. However, there are arguments against such an approach which are considered next.
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Supra n 11. 57 Essentially to that effect: Fawcett et al, supra n 4, 58; Cheshire, supra n 12, 251-52; technically, this view still leaves open the question of accessory jurisdiction under Art 5(1); however, this would effectively lead to the same result as to accept that the claim is "contractual" at the outset.
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At least if cause of action preclusion extends to both claims; see infra n 236.
59
See also infra, Section D.4 for the proposition that a judgment on a contractual claim may not have res judicata effects on a tort claim if and because the latter was not and could not be heard by the adjudicating court; this would infringe the right to be heard; see also infra, Section C.1(b).
60
Supra n 4, 58-59. 
(d) Arguments against Exclusive Effects of a Contract and for a Separate Qualifi cation of Each "Single Cause of Action"
In the fi rst place, the ECJ rather clearly rejected any exclusion of tort claims from Article 5(3) by the mere reason of a contract's existence; in so far, it provided for a separate analysis of each "single cause of action" under Article 5. 64 On the other hand, there are (at least de lege lata) good arguments for such an approach.
(i) Contrary to the Scheme and Objectives of Article 5(1) and 5(3)
Excluding tort claims from Article 5(3) by reason of the mere fact that contractual claims exist contradicts the scheme and objectives of Article 5(1) and 5(3) which provide for a "friendly coexistence on eye level" rather than for "supremacy" of one or the other provision. Although there is mutual exclusivity between these provisions, this exists only with regard to each single cause of action. There is no reason why tort claims should be excluded from Article 5(3) merely because there are contractual claims too. Such an approach would unduly -and clearly beyond the text -restrict Article 5(3). 65 Regarding the tort claim, there is still (and just as much as for the contract claim at the place of performance) a "particularly close connecting factor" at the place(s) where the harmful event occurred which still "justifi es the attribution of jurisdiction".
66
Taking the example of product liability, it is clear that such a claim falls plainly within Article 5(3) as between the manufacturer and an end-user. It would seem arbitrary and fortuitous if the latter loses this jurisdictional basis against the former if that happens to be the seller. Since he might not have known that the seller is also the manufacturer, this might create unforeseeable results and is contrary to the object of the Regulation to strengthen legal certainty "by enabling the claimant to identify easily the court in which he may sue". 67 If the Regulation attaches value to the place where the harmful event occurred in cases of product liability, there is absolutely no reason why these values should vary only because there is a contract between the parties.
(ii) Uncertain "Scope" of a Contract's Exclusive Effects
Another factor creating signifi cant uncertainty and unforeseeability is the fact that it is far from clear under which circumstances and conditions a contract should exclude tort claims from Article 5(3). In other words, when is the contract "closely enough related to the tort" and when does it "merely exist somewhere in the facts with an irrelevant remoteness"? A distinction between "parallel 64 Kalfelis, supra n 6; see supra, Section B.1(b). 65 Wolf, supra n 24, 85-86. claims" and "separate claims" (being based on "different facts") appears to lack the desired clarity too.
(iii) Relevance of the Defendant's Invocation/Proof of a Contract?
If the claimant bases his claim on tort, without mentioning or pleading any contract in the delictual forum, the question arises whether the defendant can avoid Article 5(3) jurisdiction by invoking (and possibly proving) a contract. The ECJ case law appears to suggest that, as a matter of principle, any defences by the defendant are irrelevant for the qualifi cation under Article 5(1) or 5(3): 69 (a) Gantner principle. For the purposes of lis pendens, the ECJ held in Gantner Electronic v Basch Exploitatie Maatschappij 70 that account can be taken only of the claimant's claim and not of the defendant's defences. This follows particularly from the fact that lis pendens already exists at a time before the defendant has had an opportunity to submit his defences. If the "content and nature of the claims could be modifi ed by arguments necessarily submitted … by the defendant", the "purpose of [Article 27] would be frustrated"; in particular, because it may have the result that a "court initially designated as having jurisdiction … would subsequently have to decline to hear the case". It follows that a defendant's invocation (and proof) of a contract cannot not make the cause of action a different one.
Although this judgment was only concerned with lis pendens, it can be argued that similar considerations should apply regarding the jurisdictional qualifi cation; at least in relation to Article 5(1) and 5(3): contractual and tortious claims are different causes of action under Article 27. 71 Certainly, as long as no contract is mentioned, a court may impossibly treat the claim as a contractual one. Consequently, it appears to follow from Gantner 72 that the defendant's invocation of a contract cannot make a claim originally pleaded solely in tort a contractual and thus a different one. The defendant's defences must be irrelevant also for the jurisdiction-allocation between Article 5(1) and 5(3). Likewise, it is arguable that in the delictual forum the defendant's allegation of a contract (even if he proves its existence) cannot alter the qualifi cation under Article 5(3). It appears from this line of case law, just as it does from Gantner 78 in relation to Article 27, that it is the claimant who exclusively defi nes the jurisdictional basis as regards Article 5(1) and 5(3).
(c) Ka lfelis formula. The Kalfelis defi nition 79 itself requires (apart from possible further requirements 80 ) an action which (i) seeks 81 to establish the liability of the defendant and (ii) is not related to a contract within the meaning of Article 5(1) (wherever the dividing line may be). It seems that no harm is done to that defi nition if it is reformulated as requiring an "action which is based on non-contractual liability" or an "action based on a rule of law which provides for liability irrespective of and not requiring proof of a contract". If this reading is correct, it suggests that the relevant criterion is in particular the rule of law the action is based upon; this must be one which does not presuppose an obligation freely assumed. Apparently, it is the claimant who bases his claim on a certain rule of law; defences by the defendant can only convince the court that that rule of law does not apply on the facts.
(i v) Separate Qualifi cation: Several and Different Causes of Action under Article 27
It is concluded that the "mutual exclusivity dictum" should be interpreted narrowly as referring only to each "single cause of action" in the dispute, each of which must be qualifi ed separately (whether each on its own relates to a contract). It remains to be discussed what "single cause of action" means. The Judgments Regulation uses many different terms in this context. 82 However, no clear logic behind the use of these and no distinct meaning can be identifi ed; 74 See infra, Section B.2(b)(i); alternatively, it could also be argued that Effer, supra n 73, means that the defendant's denial at least requires the claimant to establish a good arguable case that a contract exists at the jurisdictional stage (still leaving open a negative fi nding on the merits). See supra n 11. 81 It can be said that it is the claimant who seeks (by bringing such an action) to establish the liability of the defendant. 82 See supra n 16. this becomes particularly evident on a closer comparison of the different language versions. It rather seems that all of these terms are (and should be) used as synonyms, namely describing a "single cause of action".
In The Tatry 83 the ECJ interpreted the term "cause of action" in Article 27 as "compris[ing] the facts and the rule of law relied on as the basis of the action". Furthermore, it added the concept of the "same object" which is not contained in the English language version. 84 It could be argued that, in order to create a "consistent jurisdictional system" within the Judgments Regulation, the same defi nition should be adopted for qualifi cation purposes. Whether this is correct in general, cannot be answered conclusively in this article. However, it might be said that at least if different "causes of action" for the purposes of lis pendens are at issue, it is possible and necessary to qualify them separately for jurisdictional purposes as, for example, one falling under Article 5(1) and the other under Article 5(3) or both falling under the same head. It is rather clear that two claims based on different facts must be qualifi ed separately. If these claims are, however, based on the same facts but on different rules of law, it seems logical that they are to be qualifi ed separately as well. 85 Otherwise, if they are to be qualifi ed uniformly (as both together being necessarily either contractual or tortious), this would indeed lead to an exclusion of tort claims from Article 5(3). However, it is diffi cult to see how Article 27 might treat as two distinct and different things 86 what has been considered as one composite unit one logical step before.
(e) Conclusion
There is, probably enhanced by an unsophisticated use of terminology, considerable uncertainty as to the "object of qualifi cation" under Article 5. It is submitted that each "single cause of action" (particularly contractual and tortious claims) ought to be qualifi ed separately, the relevant question being whether each on its own merits relates to a contract within the meaning of Article 5(1) or is based on non-contractual liability. Accordingly, Article 5(1) and 5(3) are "mutually exclusive" only with regard to each such single cause of action. Furthermore, it is concluded that the mere existence of a contract in the set of facts does not, as such, exclude tort claims from Article 5(3) a priori. Whether the concept of the "same object" is relevant as well can be left open for present purposes as contractual and tortious claims are already based on different rules of law; see infra, Section C.1. 86 See for a discussion whether a contractual and a tortious claim constitute one or several causes of action for purposes of Art 27 infra, Section C.1(c).
Claimant's Free Choice of the Jurisdictional Rule?

(a) Overview
The purpose of this article is not to draw the demarcation between Article 5(1) and 5(3) in detail; however, the question shall be examined whether and to what extent the claimant is free to "choose", by skilful drafting of his claim, the jurisdictional rule. 88 It is submitted that the defendant's invocation of a contract in the delictual forum has no effects as to the qualifi cation under Article 5(3). 89 In so far, it is the claimant who exclusively defi nes the dispute and, accordingly, allocates the applicable jurisdictional rule. However, this does not answer the question whether it is suffi cient for the claimant to simply allege a "contract-independent liability" in the delictual forum (or a "contract-dependent liability" in the contractual forum), being entirely free to choose the jurisdictional rule, or if and to what extent he has to prove the jurisdictional requirements. Delicate questions as to the appropriate standard of proof arise. Since this issue is in extricably linked with the subject matter of this article, it will be considered to some extent.
(b ) Standard of Proof: Necessity to Prove the Existence of a Contract/Tort? (i ) Dispute about a Contract's Existence
It seems well established that the relevant standard of proof under the Judgments Regulation is a question of national law. 90 As far as English law is concerned, the claimant is required, as a general rule, to show a "good arguable case" that all jurisdictional requirements are met. 91 As regards Article 5(1), it is usually supposed that a claimant is required to establish a good arguable case as to the existence of a contract. 92 However, this is doubtful. On the one hand, Article 5(1) actually requires "matters relating to a contract" but not nec-
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See comprehensively as regards choice of law: Briggs, "choice", supra n 50. 88 Generally, such possibility is denied: Briggs and Rees, supra n 12, 261-62; Briggs, "choice", supra n 50, 25; Cheshire, supra n 12, 251; Hill and Chong, supra n 12, 133.
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See supra, Section B.1(d)(iii). essarily "a contract"; on the other hand, the case law points in a different direction.
(a) The
Effer and Boss decisions. It emerges from Effer 93 that the mere allegation by the defendant that no contract exists does not as such deprive the court of Article 5(1) jurisdiction; the claimant may invoke that provision notwithstanding such denial. This principle has been extended in Boss v Boss;
94
Saville LJ held that there is Article 5(1) jurisdiction even in the opposite case, where it is the claimant who denies the contract (in an application for negative declaration to that effect), 95 and that there are nonetheless "matters relating to a contract" in such a case because there is a "lively dispute between the parties as to whether there is a contract between them". In particular, the claimant may "establish a good arguable case that there is a matter relating to a contract by relying on the fact that this is what the [defendant is] contending against [him]" -unless the defendant withdraws his contentions. If that case has been decided correctly, 96 it establishes that the claimant, at least in an application for negative declaration, does not have to establish a good arguable case that a contract exists but it is suffi cient merely to point to the fact that the defendant asserts a contract. In other words, a good arguable case for a "matter relating to a contract" is shown if a "lively dispute" concerning the existence of a contract is established. This extension of the Effer doctrine to negative declarations appears to have been confi rmed by the ECJ in the recent decision of Folien Fischer, supra n 77, where it held that (even) an action for negative declaration seeking to establish the absence of liability in tort falls within Art 5(3); the same must apply to Art 5(1) a fortiori. Effer 98 apply and its jurisdiction "includes the power to consider the existence of the … contract itself ", a binding judgment being issued even if it will be found on the merits that there was no contract after all. However, if it decides that there is not even a good arguable case for its existence, it has to decline jurisdiction and cannot issue a binding judgment on the merits to that effect.
However, that latter inference needs not necessarily to be drawn from Effer.
99
There are good arguments that the contractual forum has jurisdiction to decide upon a mere allegation of a contract (and render a binding judgment on the merits) since that is still a "matter relating to a contract": Firstly, it follows from Boss v Boss 100 that in a case where the defendant alleges a contract but the claimant denies it (in an application for negative declaration), no good arguable case that a contract exists must be shown but it is suffi cient to point to a "lively dispute". There is no obvious reason why this should be different due to the mere fact that it is the defendant who denies the contract; the standard of proof (or the "subject to be proved") should not depend on the procedural roles of the parties. 101 Secondly, although such a proposal would at fi rst sight considerably favour the claimant, it is hard to see what he would gain by it; if he is not able to show a good arguable case, he will be bound to lose on the merits. 102 Moreover, such a decision would even have res judicata effect, preventing the unsuccessful claimant from suing all over again in another court, which is obviously in the interests of the defendant. Admittedly, there is some danger for the latter if he remains passively in the procedure (but has somehow disputed the contract) and risks a default-judgment. Furthermore, there is some potential for nuisance or vexation by the claimant. Although the latter problem might be resolved by the doctrine of abuse of process, 103 this solution is obviously not without disadvantages either; however, it still seems to be the most sensible one.
Obviously, such an approach requires some limitation of the court's jurisdiction under Article 5(1) to prevent abuse. In particular, the claimant cannot be allowed simply to invoke a contract (or apply for declaration of its non-existence) and obtain jurisdiction over related tort claims. 104 Rather, the contractual forum taking jurisdiction to decide a "lively dispute over a contract's existence" (on the basis that this dispute is a "matter relating to contract") should prima facie be limited to decide that dispute. a contract its jurisdiction will not extend beyond the decision on that point"; however, there is jurisdiction to decide with fi nality on the contract's existence. Although it would certainly be convenient to give one court the power to decide the entire dispute, such apparent convenience "cannot be allowed to overcome the jurisdictional rules set out in the [Regulation]". On the other hand, if it holds that a contract exists, its jurisdiction "extends" to adjudicate upon the contractual consequences for which remedy was sought (but still not to a further-reaching accessory jurisdiction for related tortious claims).
(ii) Common Ground about a Contract's (Non-)Existence
By contrast, where it is common ground between the parties that a contract exists, it is clear that the court has jurisdiction to decide all contractual issues. 107 More diffi cult are cases where it is common ground that no contract has ever existed. Boss v Boss 108 does not apply in such a situation since there is "no lively dispute concerning a contract's existence". However, whether and in what circumstances such a matter comes within Article 5(1) is beyond the scope of this article.
(ii i) Extension to Matters Relating to Tort
The principles of Effer 110 and Boss v Boss, 111 as set out above, have been generally extended to "matters relating to tort" by Clarke J in Equitas. 112 A claim for declaration that no tort has been committed falls within Article 5(3); the claimant does not have to establish a good arguable case that such tort was committed (which is exactly what he denies) but only to point to the defendant's contentions. Just as under Article 5(1), it is diffi cult to see why this should be different only because the procedural roles are reversed. 113 
This approach was recently confi rmed by the ECJ in Folien Fischer
114 w here it held that an action for a negative declaration, in which the natural defendant (alleged tortfeasor) seeks to establish that the natural claimant (alleged victim) has no claim in tort, still falls within Article 5(3); the procedural roles of the parties are irrelevant for the application of that provision. Furthermore, the ECJ, 115 ant to pursue such an action, is a question of national procedural law. 117 This might mean that requirements such as a "lively dispute about a contract's or tort's existence" or whether the defendant has "withdrawn his contentions" 118 are part of the national procedural law (and not Article 5).
(c) Conclusion
The case law referred to above seems to indicate that Article 5(1) and 5(3) (and, if relevant, national procedural law) do not, in fact, presuppose the existence of a contract/tort (namely the showing of a good arguable case to that effect) but only, if such is not common ground, a "genuine and lively dispute" between the parties as to the existence. If that is correct, read together with the Kalfelis defi nition as reformulated above, 119 it is suffi cient for the claimant (to come within Article 5(3)) simply to allege a rule of law providing for "contractindependent liability" and that the defendant is liable under it; then, the court must render a binding judgment on the merits. 120 Cons equently, the claimant may well "avoid the consequences of the existence of [a] contract by seeking his remedy solely in tort"; 121 rather, there is nothing the defendant can do to avoid jurisdiction under Article 5(3) (as well as under Article 5(1)). This coincides with the conclusion that the defendant's invocation of a contract cannot oust Article 5(3) jurisdiction.
122 Evidently, such jurisdiction must be limited to the issue whether or not a contract/tort exists (if it is found that it does not) in order to protect the interests of the defendant.
Accessory Jurisdiction for Related Claims? (a) Overview
Eventually, the question must be answered whether a court having jurisdiction under Article 5(1) or 5(3) can also adjudicate upon related tortious or contractual claims, respectively (accessory jurisdiction). 123 It is established that the Judgments Regulation does not contain a general jurisdictional basis for "related actions"; such can neither be derived from Article 28 124 nor from Article 6. In Kalfelis 125 the ECJ rejected accessory jurisdiction under Article 5(3); it held that a court having jurisdiction under that provision has no jurisdiction in so far as the "action" (ie the "action as a whole") is not based on tort, in particular as regards contractual claims. Whether accessory jurisdiction exists for the opposite case, namely for related tortious claims under Article 5(1), is an open question. It is more than likely that the ECJ would decide likewise. 126 The prevailing doctrine, 127 however, advocates accessory jurisdiction under Article 5(1) for related tort claims but not for the opposite case under Article 5(3) (the isolated tort claim still being pursuable in the delictual forum). It is argued that the contractual claim is the "superior" claim and constitutes the "main body" of the dispute, whereas the tort claim is considered ancillary. Another school of thought 128 supports the view that, notwithstanding Kalfelis, 129 there is accessory jurisdiction under both provisions, even Article 5(3) attracting jurisdiction for related contractual claims.
(b) Procedural Economy: Split and Consolidation of Proceedings
The main argument favouring accessory jurisdiction is based on the desire to save time and costs in the proceedings ("procedural economy"). This requires not splitting up what is in fact a "single dispute" and not limiting the "legal cognition "
130 of courts since this would cause expensive and burdensome parallel proceedings and also heighten the risk of irreconcilable judgments. However, it can be objected that even if accessory jurisdiction was allowed, it is still subject to the claimant's will to make use of this attraction (being an "additional jurisdictional basis") or to pursue the claims under Article 5(1) and 5(3) separately. 131 Accordingly, a split of proceedings cannot necessarily be avoided at the outset.
Nonetheless, the claimant is still free to pursue all claims together under Article 2. In this context, it is often stated that Article 28 might also provide for an appropriate instrument. 132 An application for subsequent consolidation under Article 28(2) (whether by the claimant or the defendant) requires that the court fi rst seised has original jurisdiction over the related claim (under a provision other than Article 28 133 ). However, if the claimant sues separately under Article 5(1) and 5(3), denying accessory jurisdiction under these provision precisely means that the court fi rst seised lacks jurisdiction over the related claim. Evidently, an application for consolidation may in this context only be successful if the court fi rst seised has jurisdiction under Article 2 (the claimant confi ning the action to the contractual or the tortious claim).
Generally, only disadvantages of the claimant are pointed out in this context; 134 however, the defendant may also be adversely affected if the claimant chooses to pursue his claims separately as he has to face two sets of proceedings and might be induced to settlement. The defendant might effect "consolidation" of related claims by entering an appearance (Article 24) if the related claim (for which the court would otherwise not have jurisdiction) has been pleaded by the claimant and is not pending in another forum yet. That might also be possible by fi ling a counter-claim for declaration of non-existence of the related claim (Article 6(3)), but again only if that is not yet pending in another court. On the other hand, if the claimant has already brought both claims in different fora, there is nothing the defendant can do to consolidate the two proceedings if accessory jurisdiction is not allowed (Article 28(2) accordingly not being applicable).
It follows that the concept of accessory jurisdiction would indeed gain something (although little) in terms of procedural economy since only then might Article 28(2) apply, being the only instrument for consolidation available con-trary to the will of the claimant. However, to express it in the words of Lord Clyde in a related context, such apparent procedural convenience "cannot be allowed to overcome the jurisdictional rules set out in the [Regulation]".
(c) Affected Parties' Interests and Potential Abuse
It is argued that the claimant would be unreasonably disfavoured if he had to sue in different fora and that the defendant's additional burden would be minimal since he has to face proceedings in that forum anyway and that it would rather be in the latter's interests (too) to have only one set of proceedings. However, it can be objected that the claimant can still pursue all claims together under Article 2; his interests are not signifi cantly affected since he is not at all forced to maintain multiple proceedings. On the other hand, accessory jurisdiction would provide him an additional jurisdictional basis that he would otherwise not have and give rise to unwelcome forum shopping. Although it is true that it is usually in the defendant's interests to have only one set of proceedings, it is likewise in his interests to be sued at his domicile as far as possible.
More importantly, accessory jurisdiction would enable the claimant to (abusively) obtain unjustifi ed jurisdictional bases: taking the view that a good arguable case for the contract/tort's existence must be established by the claimant to come within Article 5(1) or 5(3), 136 he might obtain jurisdiction for a related claim by merely showing a good arguable case for the principal claim, although exactly knowing that, on the merits, he will not be able to prove the latter. Taking the view that, as argued here, the claimant may obtain jurisdiction by mere allegation (whereupon the court renders a binding judgment at least on the existence of a contract/tort), 137 the potential for abuse is even more evident.
(d) Restrictive Interpretation of Article 5
Other convincing arguments can be derived from the scheme and objectives of the Judgments Regulation: the ECJ is keen to emphasise the exceptional character of Article 5 which is interpreted restrictively, not undermining the principle of actor sequitur forum rei. 138 Evidently, any accessory jurisdiction would unduly broaden the wording of Article 5(1) and 5(3) and pierce the bounds between these provisions which are clearly distinguished in the Regulation. It would in many cases effectively lead to another (or two other) jurisdictional 135 Kleinwort Benson, supra n 11, [183] . 136 See supra n 92. 137 See supra, Section B.2(b). 138 Kalfelis, supra n 6, [ basis with unlimited legal cognition and reduce the importance of Article 2. Furthermore, the raison d'être of Article 5(1) and 5(3) is the existence of a "particularly close connecting factor between a dispute and the court". 139 However, su ch a close connecting factor would not exist in relation to the accessory claim. An argumentum e contrario can, moreover, be derived from Article 6 which exhaustively provides for fora connexitatis.
Sometimes, arguments are based on a strand of ECJ case law directing towards a "centralization of jurisdiction". 140 However, such an approach was clearly rejected in Kalfelis. 141 Furthermore, the ECJ held in Leathertex 142 that the contractual forum does not even have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon related contractual claims; it must follow a fortiori that it certainly does not have so for related tortious claims.
(e) Consequen ce: Limited Legal Cognition
It is submitted that, overall, the better view is (at least de lege lata) that neither Article 5(1) nor 5(3) provide for accessory jurisdiction. In other words, the contractual forum can adjudicate only upon contractual claims, the tortious forum only upon tortious claims. As a logical consequence of this conclusion, a court assuming jurisdiction under Article 5(1) or 5(3) has, in civil law terminology, 143 only a limited legal cognition. 144, 145 Considering whether or not to grant the relief sought, the court's power to determine and apply the applicable law is limited to the "law of contracts" or the "law of torts", respectively.
fori).
147 As a matter of European law, the Judgments Regulation limits these procedural principles as far as Article 5 is concerned and has, accordingly, an impact on national procedural law. Although it is perfectly possible that, under national law, the parties only have to declare the remedy sought and plead and prove the facts relied upon (but not the law), the Judgments Regulation prevents the court from considering legal bases which possibly provide for such a remedy but for which it does not have jurisdiction. In other words, even if the parties "give the facts", the judge is only entitled to "give part of the law".
C. CONCURRENT LIABILITY: MULTIPLE PROCEEDINGS
It is concluded that the contractual forum has only (but still) jurisdiction to adjudicate upon contractual claims and the delictual forum only (but still) to do so upon tortious claims. If these causes of action arise from the same facts and the claimant brings separate parallel proceedings, 148 the question arises whether these involve the "same cause of action" for purposes of Article 27 (to the effect that the court seised second has to stay or decline its proceedings) or, if not, they fall under Article 28 (related actions).
Article 27 : Same Cause of Action? (a) Applying the Autonomous Interpretation of the ECJ
The ECJ has defi ned the term "same cause of action" in Article 27 as comprising "the facts and the rule of law relied on as the basis of the action" 149 and added the concept of the "same object", which is not expressly referred to in the English version, and defi ned it as "the end the action has in view". 150 Following that case law, it is rather evident that contractual and tortious claims, arising from the same facts, are based on different rules of law:
151,152 the forme r is based on the "law of contracts" (contractual basis), the latter on the "law of torts" (tortious basis). Consequently, separate proceedings for such claims must 147 In some legal systems (as opposed to England) this principle is, to some extent, even extended to foreign law. 148 Either under Art 5(1) and 5(3) or under Art 2 (limited to either claim) and Art 5. 149 The Tatry, supra n 71, [38] . 150 Gubisch, supra n 84, [14] ; The Tatry, supra n 71, [37], [40] . 151 "Rule of law" does not refer to any particular provision but to a more functional or teleological concept; F Dasser, "Art 27" in Oberhammer and Dasser, supra n 127, 574; Leible, supra n 31, 649-50. 152 In Maersk, supra n 71, the ECJ considered an action for damages as a different cause of action than an application for the establishment of a liability limitation fund since, even if the facts were the same, "the legal rule which forms the basis of each of those applications is different. … The [former] is based on the law governing non-contractual liability, whereas the [latter] is based on the 1957 Convention."
involve different causes of action for the purposes of Article 27. 153 Furthermore , it seems reasonably clear that such proceedings cannot have the same end in view as they seek to establish different liabilities.
154
Even if the rule of law was considered irrelevant, contractual and tortious claims may be said, strictly speaking, to be based on slightly "different facts": although both might well arise from the very same incident, only the former requires pleading and proof of a contract concluded between the parties; this preceding "factual complex of reaching an agreement" is by defi nition not presupposed by the tort claim.
Consequently, although the ECJ has interpreted Article 27 "broadly", 155 it is diffi cult to see how one might consider contractual and tortious claims as the same cause of action without substantially changing the corresponding defi nition under Article 27.
(b) Limited L egal Cognition: No Lis Pendens and No Res Judicata
It is submitted that Article 5(1) and 5(3) do not allow contractual and tortious claims to be brought together, both heads providing for a limited legal cognition of the court. 156 Firstly, if the court seised second were obliged to decline jurisdiction as regards a claim which is not and cannot be heard and tried in the court seised fi rst, Article 27 would lead to a denial of justice.
157 Secondly, i t will be argued in Section D that a judgment on one claim does not have preclusive res judicata effects on the other claim; inter alia because that would infringe the right to be heard. 158 Assuming that this is correct, it would be to export a concept derived from (German) national procedural law according to which the relevant cause of action is exclusively defi ned by reference to the set of facts and the relief sought but not the rule of law (thereby speculating that the ECJ "self-evidently" did not mean what it said in The Tatry, supra n 71); he also supports the view that the contractual forum has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon tortious claims and vice versa (see supra n 128) thereby denying any limitation of the court's legal cognition; however, both suggestions are bound to fail since the corresponding argumentation is entirely based on (irrelevant) German procedural law. 154 See R Fentiman, "Art 27" in Magnus and Mankowski, supra n 15, 587-88, generally suggesting that a common object is both, necessary and suffi cient.
pointless to oblige a court to decline jurisdiction if it is clear from the outset that it will have to resume 159 proceedings as soon as the fi rst court has rendered its judgment.
(c) Contract and Tort Claim: One Cause of Action or Several?
So far, it has been implied that both the contractual and the tortious claim are to be qualifi ed separately, each being a "cause of action" for the purposes of Article 27; this is self-evidently a prerequisite for considering them as "different" causes of action. However, there is no clarity as to the exact "object of qualifi cation" and the extent to which Article 27 applies.
In Kloeckner v Gatoil Overseas, 161 a case concerning several invoices and contracts of sale, Hirst J held that Article 27 only applies as far as the same contracts and invoices are concerned: "every claim on each contract of sale … is itself technically a separate cause of action, and these cannot … all be bundled together into one composite cause of action". In Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 162 it was held that, although a contractual claim was barred by Article 27, a tortious claim was not, implying that these are to be qualifi ed separately, each being a "separate cause of action". Lawrence Collins J nonetheless acknowledged that "[t]o split the actions in this way is by no means satisfactory" but he felt that the decisions of the ECJ dictate this result. Indeed, authority for such a "claim-by-claim approach" might probably be found in The Tatry 163 where the ECJ established a corresponding "party-by-party approach". Accordingly, the prevailing school of thought counsels a view that Article 27 shall apply as far as there is identity between the causes of actions underlying the actions in the two proceedings. 164 In contrast, Andrew Smith J in Evialis v SIAT 165 
and Beatson J in Underwriting Members of Lloyd's Syndicate v Sinco
166 rejected look ing at "separate causes of action within the proceedings" but, instead, took the approach of looking at the "proceedings as a whole" and "ask [ing] what is the central or essential issue". Inter alia, they relied on the fact that "[A]rticles 27 and 28 refer to 'actions' and 'proceedings', and … do not contemplate parts of actions or proceedings 159 Art 27 (just as Art 28) applies only as long as the fi rst proceedings are " [206] . 162 Supra n 153, [207] - [210] , [244] . 163 Supra n 71; adopted by AG Tesauro, supra n 157, [17]- [18] . 164 being stayed". 167 However, it mu st be noted that Article 27, in fact, also refers to "causes of action".
In both cases, the issue was whether "jurisdictional claims" in England (such as anti-suit injunctions or claims for breach of jurisdiction clause) are barred by earlier foreign proceedings concerning the substantive claim if the jurisdictional issue is raised there. It is reasonably clear that such preliminary issues do not found separate causes of action. 168 However, that does not answer the present problem as the legal bases, upon which the remedy sought is based, are more than preliminary issues; rather, there are several main subject matters if it is based on several bases.
It is submitted that the "object of qualifi cation" under Article 27 correlates with the one in relation to jurisdiction under Article 5. 169 Whenever two proceedings involve different facts and/or the remedies sought are based on different rules of law and/or they pursue different objects, we are concerned with independent causes of action capable of being qualifi ed differently. It follows that Article 27 applies only (but at least) as far as the two proceedings are concerned with the same legal bases. If the claimant has several shots on the target, success of each leading to full satisfaction, each shot must be analysed separately as to whether the claimant is trying to shoot the same ball twice at different goals.
Likewise, if the second proceedings are broader than the fi rst (involving more causes of action), Article 27 will operate only (but at least) in relation to the causes of action common to both proceedings. 170 After all, this "claim-by-claim analysis" under Article 27 is a necessary consequence of splitting proceedings as envisaged in Kalfelis 171 and its resulting limitation of the legal cognition: 172 if proceedings under Article 5 (and/or a judgment) concerning one claim would bar the other, this would lead to a denial of justice and an infringement of the right to be heard.
Article 28: R elated Actions?
Having concluded that Article 27 does not apply 173 in relation to contractual and tortious claims, the question remains whether Article 28 may apply, namely whether the claims are "related" within the meaning of the legal defi nition of Article 28(3). The ECJ has interpreted this autonomous requirement broadly as covering "all cases where there is a risk of confl icting decisions, even if the judgments can be separately enforced and their legal consequences are not mutually exclusive". 174 In Sarrio v Ku wait Investment Authority 175 Lord Saville favoured a "broad commonsense approach" and a "simple wide test … refraining from an over-sophisticated analysis".
It is still an open question whether the connection requirement in Article 28(3) is to be interpreted in the same way as the one in Article 6(1). 176 Although these apparently similar concepts are framed in identical words, 177 there are tensions in their interpretations: Article 6(1) is (still) an exception to Article 2 and to be interpreted narrowly, 178 whereas Article 28 is to be interpreted broadly; 179 however, the underlying purpose of both provisions is the same, namely to avoid confl icting judgments. 180 Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to treat authorities on Article 6(1) as, at least, persuasive for Article 28(3). Furthermore, it appears that if a connection is found under Article 6(1), the same must apply a fortiori for Article 28(3) since the latter is broader.
Concerning Article 6(1), the ECJ held obiter in Réunion Européenne that a contractual and a tortious claim "cannot be regarded as connected". 181 However, paragraph 50 of that decision was strongly criticised 182 and Lloyd J doubted its correctness in Watson v First Choice Holidays. 183 Finally, the ECJ essentially overruled 184 that paragraph in Freeport v Arnoldsson 185 and held that the fact that claims have "different legal bases does not preclude application of [Article 6(1)]".
Following that line of reasoning, it appears that contractual and tortious claims, arising from the same facts, might well be "related" also within the meaning of Article 28(3). 186 If so, the second court may (on its own motion) stay its proceedings (Article 28(1)) or (on an application of either party) decline jurisdiction and refer the case to the fi rst court for consolidation (Article 28(2)). Both options require that the action in the fi rst court is still "pending"; 187 they are unavailable after defi ni te termination of the fi rst proceedings. In addition to the requirement that a consolidation must be admissible under the lex fori of the fi rst court, Article 28(2) requires that that court has original 188 jurisdiction over the second claim too. However, in a case where a contractual claim is pursued under Article 5(1) and, subsequently, a related tortious claim under Article 5(3), or vice versa, this latter jurisdiction requirement is usually 189 not satisfi ed since there is no accessory jurisdiction under these provisions. 190 This means that, in such a case, only Article 28(1) may apply and the second court may only "wait" for the result of the fi rst court and potentially take into account its fi ndings. However, as soon as the fi rst proceedings are terminated, it is obliged to resume its own proceedings.
D. CONCURRENT LIABILITY: RES JUDICA TA ISSUES
It is concluded that parallel proceedings concerning concurrent liability may perfectly occur -one concerning a contractual claim (under Article 5(1)), the other concerning a tortious claim (under Article 5(3)). As long as both proceedings are pending, Article 27 is not applicable as they concern different causes of action; Article 28 can at most lead to a stay. However, as soon as either is terminated and a judgment has been given, Article 28 is inapplicable too; 191 any granted stay must be lifted. Instead, the judgment might have to be recognised under Chapter III in the still pending proceedings (Article 33); if so, it has res judicata status and produces certain preclusive effects. The question arises whether and to what extent a Chapter III judgment on a contractual claim precludes related tortious claims (or vice versa). These rather complex and largely unsettled questions of preclusion cannot be examined in full detail in this article; however, a brief overview will be provided. 
English Law (Overview)
It is convenient to start with a look at English domestic law, 193 under which, once a foreign judgment is recognised as having res judicata status, it produces cause of action preclusion between the parties: on the one hand, it prevents the parties from contradicting the foreign determination of the (non)existence of a cause of action (cause of action estoppel); on the other hand, it prevents reassertion of and suing on the same (original) cause of action for which recovery has, though less than hoped, already been granted (statutory former recovery plea 194 ). In addition, issue preclusion prevents, in certain circumstances, either party from contradicting issues which have been decided by the foreign court as a necessary basis of the judgment (issue estoppel). Alongside these classical res judicata pleas, the so-called Henderson plea, which is based on abuse of process, 195 precludes matters which were not decided in the earlier proceedings but which, because properly belonging to that litigation, could and should have been raised and decided there. 196 In the present context, mainly cause of action preclusion is of interest; in particular, whether contractual and related tortious claims are considered as the "same causes of action", 197 judgment on one precluding the other. In the absence of clear authority, that question is unsettled; furthermore, there is no satisfactory defi nition of the constituent parts of a "cause of action". Sometimes it is defi ned by reference to the facts and (at least as regards torts) the right infringed; 198 this rather narrow defi nition might lead to the conclusion that contractual and tortious claims are different ones. Sometimes, emphasis is rather on the factual situation only, namely on the act of the defendant which gives the claimant his cause of complaint and entitlement to a remedy; 199 this broader defi nition would probably embrace both claims. On the other hand, distinction is drawn between alternative 200 and cumulative 201 remedies or causes of action, only the former leading to preclusion; 202 this obviously leads to diffi cult choiceof-law questions as to which law determines whether remedies are cumulative or alternative.
No clear answer can be given whether contractual and related tortious claims are the same 203 or distinct 204 causes of action under English law. However, even if we are concerned with "different causes of action", it is still arguable that at least the Henderson rule applies: if only one claim was pursued in the foreign proceedings, an English court might strike out the other as an abuse of process if and because it could and should have been raised in the earlier litigation as properly belonging to it. 
Preclusive Effects of a Regulation Judgment: Applicable Law
The preclusive effects attributed to judgments differ considerably from one legal system to another. 206 Outside the Regulation, it is clear that the law of the recognising state (as the lex fori) determines which is the law determining the preclusive effects of a recognised foreign judgment. 207 be accorded. 209 In contrast, the doctrine of extension of effects obliges the recognising court to apply the preclusive laws of the state of origin, extending the original effects throughout the EU. 210 Whereas the Regulation itself is completely silent on that point, the Jenard Report favours the latter approach. 213 it qualifi ed that statement and appears to have adopted a combination of the two approaches, namely that, although the law of the state of origin is still relevant in principle, there is "no reason for granting to a judgment, when it is enforced, … effects that a similar judgment given directly in the [enforcing state] would not have".
In contrast, Barnett 214 and Briggs and Rees 215 suggest that the answer differs in relation to each preclusive plea. The Schlosser Report appears to suggest that this is a question of national law. 
. Cause of Action Preclusion: Relevance of Article 27?
Under all approaches outlined above, national law 217 would apply (whichever it may be), there being no uniform solution. However, a more modern school of thought counsels relevance, to whatever extent, of Article 27 on the question whether the "same causes of action" and the "same parties" are involved, not only for purposes of lis pendens but also (at least) for cause of action preclusion. 218 In De Wolf v Cox 219 the ECJ held that, after a judgment (in favour of the claimant) has been given in one Member State, no proceedings may be brought in another on the same (original) cause of action between the same parties. This establishes a mandatory, uniform former recovery plea, based on European law. 220, 221 As the ECJ particularly based its reasoning on Article 27, 222 one might infer that the requirements of this plea (particularly what are "same causes of action") follow likewise from Article 27. In Drouot Assurances v CMI,
223
the ECJ was concerned with the requirement of the "same parties" under Article 27. It held that, in a case concerning formally different parties, there can still be "such a degree of identity between the interests of [the parties] that a judgment delivered against one of them would have the force of res judicata as against the other" and that therefore they "must be considered to be one and the same party for the purposes of [Article 27]". This can probably be understood as also meaning, the other way round, that if the parties are considered the same under Article 27, they will both be bound by the effects of res judicata.
224
The same approach was adopted by 230 There are strong arguments that, if not applying directly, account should at least be taken of Article 27 and its corresponding jurisprudence in order to determine the scope of cause of action preclusion of a Regulation judgment. Firstly, it would rarely be sensible to oblige a court to decline jurisdiction under Article 27 in favour of other proceedings if any resulting judgment would not bar the second proceedings. Certainly, there may be good reasons for the second court to stay proceedings and await the judgment of the fi rst court, particularly in order to benefi t from issue estoppels. However, if it is clear from the outset that proceedings will have to be resumed, 231 Article 28 appears to be the appropriate instrument, being merely discretionary. Secondly, such a solution would enhance uniformity and legal certainty in international litigation and would, just as Article 27, help to avoid situations of Article 34(3).
232
Regarding the particular case considered here, there are other compelling arguments: it has been concluded that Article 5(1) and 5(3) do not allow bringing contractual and tortious claims together, both provisions limiting the legal cognition of the court. 235 Assuming cause of action preclusion for both claims would effectively lead to a substantive extinction of one or the other claim.
236
Although the claimant is still free to bring both claims together under Article 2 and the defendant possibly to fi le a counter-claim (usually for negative declaration) under Article 6(3) 237 (both options preventing such an extinction), the framers certainly did not intend the bringing of a claim under Article 5 to potentially amount to a waiver by the claimant of another claim.
Furthermore, it would infringe the right to be heard (Article 6(1) ECHR 238 ) since the original forum under Article 5 did not have jurisdiction to hear the other claim (limited legal cognition). It would deny justice 239 if the claimant was, in the original proceedings, excluded from pleading matters which the court was not entitled to hear, and, in subsequent proceedings, precluded by the judgment on the ground that the matter has been tried and heard and cannot be re-litigated. It is plain that the doctrine of res judicata is inevitably linked to, and in fact based on, the right to be heard. It ensures that this right is granted no more than once; however, that right itself demands that it is granted at least in one proper trial. Consequently, the preclusive effects may reach no further than the right to be heard was effectively granted. This is another reason why it is the Regulation (and the ECHR) which, by limiting jurisdiction and the corresponding legal cognition, requires limitation of the preclusive effects as well.
It could be objected that both parties have somehow had, in fact, an opportunity to try the precluded claim in court: the claimant could have brought both claims under Article 2; the defendant could have instigated a counter-claim. One could be inclined to say that, since both parties have had the chance to be heard, they should be subjected to the preclusive effects of res judicata in respect of both claims. However, Article 5 certainly does not intend to force claimants to irrevocably waive claims not falling under the respective head; this would substantially lessen the attractiveness of Article 5. Moreover, claimants would, when suing under Article 5, rarely be aware of such a waiver. Be that as it may, extending preclusive effects to both claims would still infringe the right to be heard as it still precludes the claimant, in subsequent proceedings, from 235 See supra, Section B.3(e). 236 Even if the second claim can still be brought under Art 5 or (confi ned to that claim) under Art 2 (if regarded as different causes of action under Art 27), as soon as judgment on either claim was given, the other would be precluded and thus effectively extinguished. 237 Arguably, these claims arise from the "same facts", being suffi ciently connected; see supra, Section C.2 (concerning the connection-requirement in Art 28 pleading a claim on the ground that he could have pleaded it in a hypothetical earlier trial, although he could not in fact plead it throughout the actual trial.
It is concluded that, qua European law (and the ECHR), contractual and tortious claims do not concern the same cause of action, there being no cause of action preclusion. Even if there is room for the Henderson rule under the Regulation 240 and even if the related claim is considered to "properly belong to the litigation", that rule can simply not apply if the original court has taken jurisdiction under Article 5 since the claimant could not have raised the matter in that litigation for lack of jurisdiction. 241 In contrast, it may be argued that Henderson applies if the claimant brings only one claim under Article 2.
Multiple Judgments: No Double Satisfaction
The result is that the claimant may well obtain two judgments, one on the contractual, the other on the tortious claim. Such judgments are not irreconcilable (Article 34(3)) since they rule on different liabilities which may well exist in parallel. No problem arises if one or both claims are dismissed. However, if the claimant obtains two judgments which both award full damages, it is obvious that he cannot, in the aggregate, recover an amount in excess of his loss. English law (as probably any civilised law) does not (based on equitable principles and probably as a matter of public policy) tolerate double satisfaction. 242 Certainly, the Regulation does not intend to alter that; it is probably a matter of national law how to deal with prevention of double satisfaction at the enforcement stage. It is clear that a creditor, having obtained two judgments in his favour, "must give credit to the extent that either judgment is satisfi ed": 243 payment on one satisfi es the other too. 244 If payment is made before the second judgment was given, this substantively extinguishes the second claim (and prevents a second judgment in favour of the claimant).
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E. CONCLUSION
Applying the Regulation as currently in force and as interpreted by the ECJ, it is concluded that in cases where the claimant (allegedly) has, arising from one and the same incident, a contractual and a tortious cause of action, both are to be qualifi ed separately for jurisdictional purposes. Although Article 5(1) and 5(3) are, indeed, mutually exclusive, that is so only in relation to each "single cause of action" but not as regards the "entire dispute". It follows that the mere existence of a contract in the parties' relationship does not as such exclude related tortious claims from Article 5(3); such may perfectly well fall within that provision if the alleged liability does not presuppose any contract, the tortious duty existing independently. It has been argued that the claimant does not need to establish a good arguable case as to the existence of a contract/tort in order to obtain jurisdiction under Article 5(1) or 5(3); 246 this largely allows him to choose the jurisdictional basis. However, if the court fi nds that no contract/tort exists, it will only (but at least) render a binding judgment to that effect.
It has also been concluded that neither Article 5(1) nor 5(3) allow accessory jurisdiction for related claims; apart from Article 2, the contractual claim can only be brought under Article 5(1), the tortious claim only under Article 5(3). Accordingly, both provisions limit the legal cognition of the court. As a necessary consequence of this splitting of the dispute, parallel proceedings must be possible; contractual and tortious claims are not the same causes of action under Article 27. However, they may be related under Article 28, allowing a discretionary stay.
As soon as judgment on one claim is given, the question arises whether it precludes the other claim. It has been argued that they are not the same causes of action for res judicata purposes, there being no cause of action preclusion. Arguably, this follows directly from European law, the Judgments Regulation predetermining cause of action preclusion of Regulation judgments. Certainly, if a creditor obtains two judgments in his favour, both awarding full compensation, he must give credit for both to the extent that either is satisfi ed; double satisfaction cannot be tolerated.
One might legitimately question whether the solution as elaborated in this article, which allows fragmentation of proceedings and litigation of connected (or even identical) factual issues in more than one forum, is a sensible or desirable one in terms of policy and practicality. Furthermore, the solution is admittedly of considerable complexity. However, this is de lege lata -if properly thought to an end -the result of a jurisdictional system, as interpreted by the ECJ, which splits disputes by reference to different causes of action (and their legal bases), at the same time denying jurisdiction based on relatedness. Although the latter and any "centralization of jurisdiction" would certainly have practical advantages, it would require, de lege ferenda, a fundamental reform and, to a considerable extent, departure of the idea of actor sequitur forum rei being the cardinal jurisdictional principle.
